



ExeterAirport

Part of Regional & City Airports

Exeter Airport ACP

26th February 2019

Assessment meeting



Safety and Airspace Regulation Group

Agenda for CAP1616 Assessment Meeting

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|----|---|----------------|
| 1. | Introduction/Apologies for Absence | CAA |
| 2. | Statement of Need (discussion & review) | All |
| 3. | Issues or opportunities arising from proposed change | Change Sponsor |
| 4. | Options to exploit opportunities or address issues identified | Change Sponsor |
| 5. | Provisional indication of the level and process requirements | CAA |
| 6. | Provisional process timescales | All |
| 7. | Next Steps | All |
| 8. | AOB | All |

2. Statement of Need (1)

1. The Requirement:
 - To adapt the existing airspace structure surrounding Exeter Airport to assist Air Traffic Control (ATC) in providing enhanced levels of information to aircraft operating in and out of the Airport, and to aircraft operating in the local area.
2. The principle concerns:
 - limited protection currently afforded to Commercial Air Transport (CAT) aircraft flying final approach and initial departure routes through Class G Uncontrolled Airspace, outside the Aerodrome Traffic Zone (ATZ).
 - ATC tactical intervention repeatedly required in order to maintain separation from local and transitory general aviation users.
 - The rules regarding the provision of Air Traffic Services (ATS) to aircraft in Class G airspace are designed to minimise the risks to all aircraft. The ability of air traffic controllers to intervene with traffic avoidance instructions, given the rates of closure and climb/descent profiles, is limited. On initial departure and final recovery commercial aircraft also have limited manoeuvrability and therefore a limited response to warnings.
3. This difficult environment has led to a number of reportable safety events between unknown aircraft and aircraft arriving and departing to/from Exeter:
 - Three AIRPROX events were recorded in 2016; and
 - ATC logged over 600 instances of controller intervention due to unknown aircraft over the 8-year period between 2009 and 2016.
4. Exeter ATC continue to intervene in potential safety events **every week**, delaying or halting departures, providing avoidance instructions and extending departure and arrival routes. This causes:
 - Significant controller workload and distraction; and
 - Significant crew workload in the cockpit for unexpected /short notice ATC interventions.
5. In Summer 2018, Exeter Airport began a formal 18month study to monitor, record and analyse frequency of formal ATC intervention, and is encouraging operators to report.

2. Statement of Need (2)

6. While current operations are tolerably safe, a disproportionate amount of controller capacity is consumed ensuring this is the case. However, the prevalence of unknown traffic operating within the vicinity of the Airport could easily lead to a degradation of Safety margins.
7. Exeter Airport's business risk register records 'airborne conflict' as the most significant risk, a position supported by their CAA ATS Inspector.
8. During the Oversight Audit of January 2017, the ATS inspector recorded in his report:
 - [During the audit and at the out [sic] brief discussion took place regarding the status of the units ACP for CAS at Exeter and this included detailed talks on gliding operations in the area and their impact on the units operation. The ATS Inspector re-affirmed his support for the proposal, having had first-hand knowledge of the difficult situations presented to Exeter controllers whilst providing radar services in this at times very busy environment.]
 - At a meeting on 25th June 2017, the purpose of which was described by the aerodrome inspector as being to discuss [... your operational safety risks and to share with you both your view and the CAA's joined up overview of your significant safety risks in a collaborative and transparent way.] the inspector recorded that [...the unit's main ATS safety risks (taken from their current risk register) were: 1 Airborne Conflict...]
9. The lead ATS Inspector stated in the 2018 Oversight Report:
 - [It was noted that the unit still continues to experience incidents of GA aircraft passing through their instrument runways final approach track without advising them often resulting in an incident or airprox. Such a recent incident was reviewed in detail whilst auditing the units UCS and incident investigation process and gives defining evidence of the need to have the protection of CAS to avoid such events, especially where large passenger aircraft are being operated.]

3. Issues and Opportunities

- Issues:
 - Constraints relating to facilitating Access to all airspace users
 - Previous application did not require Environmental Study as no new or altered ground tracks or direct increase in capacity are proposed. Can we make the same case for this new application?
 - Influence and requirements of other ATS providers (military and NATS), the gliding community, and commercial operators at Dunkeswell Airfield are challenging.
- Opportunities
 - Reduce ATC intervention
 - Reduce diversion track miles flown
 - Seek an overall reduction in ground & air delays (improvement for air traffic & passengers)
 - Build relationships with local, regional and national stakeholders through early and open dialogue (facilitated by CAP1616 guidance)
 - Reduce operational safety risks

4. Options to Exploit or Address

- Address:
 - Stakeholder engagement and resolution of issues relating to:
 - D012, D013
 - RNAS Yeovilton
 - Devon and Somerset Gliding Club (DSGC)
 - Dunkeswell commercial and gliding community
 - Evidence that no tracks over the ground are changing
 - Integration with airways, adjacent ANSPs and delegated airspace (Cardiff, Bristol, NATS Swanwick, Western Radar)
- Exploit
 - Comprehensive options requirement of CAP1616
 - Guidance in the containment policy (for options) whilst not relying on it
 - Safety Argument and incident logs to ensure options are driven by safety
 - Previous application did not require Environmental Study as no new or altered ground tracks or direct increase in capacity are proposed. Can we make the same case for this new application?

5. Provisional Indication of Level



CAA RESPONSE

6. Provisional Process Timescales

- Define Gateway – 31st May 2019
- Develop and Assess – 30th August 2019
- Consult Gateway – 25th October 2019
- Consultation – November 2019 - February 2020 (12w plus Christmas)
- End of Stage 3 – 30th April 2020
- Submit - 31st May 2020
- Decide Gateway – 27th November 2020
- Target AIRAC 2021 range:

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|---------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| AIRAC 07/2021 | 16-Apr-21 | 03-Jun-21 | 15-Jul-21 |
| AIRAC 08/2021 | 14-May-21 | 01-Jul-21 | 12-Aug-21 |
| AIRAC 09/2021 | 11-Jun-21 | 29-Jul-21 | 09-Sep-21 |

7. Next Steps

- Minutes of this meeting agreed
- Sponsor writes letter of intent to proceed
- Stage 1 B: Develop Design Principles
 - See next slide
- Aiming for Define Gateway: 31st May 2019

Step 1B Design Principles

Engagement going forwards on Design Principles:

- Aviation stakeholders
 - NATS Swanwick
 - Bristol Airport
 - Cardiff Airport
 - RNAS Yeovilton
 - DAATM, reference D012 and D013
 - Dunkeswell Aerodrome
 - Devon and Somerset Gliding Club
 - GA Community
- Non-aviation stakeholders
 - Local Authorities/LPA
 - Elected local representatives (MP/MEP)
 - Are these relevant if no ground track or direct capacity changes expected?
- Proposed method:
 - Structured questionnaire
 - Defined local engagement (including focus groups)
 - Use of consultative committees
 - Consolidated list of Design Principles (DP) agreed and/or reasons for disagreement recorded



8. AOB